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APPLYING THE G O O D FAITH EXCEPTION TO 
THE PARTICULARITY AND EXECUTION OF 
SEARCH WARRANTS: Maryland v. Garrison* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few social problems in the last decade have raised the public's 
conscience like illegal drug use and abuse. Television documenta-
ries, advertising campaigns, and drug literature denouncing drug 
abuse have become commonplace in today's society. Government 
officials and scholars constantly stress the connection between ille-
gal drugs and violent crime. In response to these concerns, Presi-
dent Reagan declared a war on drugs. The early results of this war 
are notable. For instance, the number of convictions for violation of 
the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act between 1980 and 
1985 almost doubled.1 The public became aware of the problem 
and embraced the President's war on drugs. 
Unfortunately, the success of the administration's war on drugs 
has often come at the expense of individual constitutional liberties 
and freedoms. One area heavily attacked since Reagan's declared 
war is fourth amendment protections. The courts repeatedly have 
been asked to resolve a conflict between an individual's fourth 
amendment rights and law enforcement officers' duty to search for 
and seize contraband. 
Maryland v. Garrison2 is such a case. In Garrison, the Supreme 
Court further narrowed the scope of the fourth amendment by cre-
ating a new "Reasonable Factual Mistake" exception to the war-
rant requirement. This decision follows the recent trend of Supreme 
Court decisions since the President's declared war on drugs, leading 
to the possibility of a "Drug Exception" to the fourth amendment.3 
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court decision in Garrison and 
consider whether the benefits of curtailing the spread of illegal 
drugs outweigh the detriments to personal liberty. 
* David R. Smith 
1 In 1980, there were 2,541 convictions compared to 4,727 in 1985. Statistical Abstract 
of the United States 1987 (107 ed. No. 297 1987). 
2 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987). 
3 See Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38 
HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). This note expands on the ideas advanced in Wisotsky's article. 
Apparently, Wisotsky deserves the credit for coining the phrase "Drug Exception." 
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I I . SEARCH WARRANTS AND THE F O U R T H 
AMENDMENT 
The fourth amendment protects citizens "against unreasonable 
searches and seizures" and provides that "no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized."4 The Supreme Court has ruled that the fourth 
amendment protects any interest in which an individual has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.6 The fourth amendment protects 
people not places.6 
A search warrant satisfies the fourth amendment when it meets 
the following four requirements: (1) the warrant is supported by 
probable cause; (2) the warrant is issued by a neutral and detached 
magistrate; (3) the warrant describes with particularity the places 
to be searched and the things to be seized; and (4) the warrant is 
executed properly.7 The Garrison decision addresses the third and 
fourth requirements. 
The purpose of requiring particularity is to protect the individ-
ual's privacy interest from a general search or "general, exploratory 
rumaging in a person's belongings."8 A place to be searched is suffi-
ciently described if the executing officers can ascertain and identify 
the place with reasonable effort.9 Before Garrison, only the particu-
lar place described in the search warrant could be lawfully searched 
pursuant to the warrant.10 
Although these same principles apply regardless of the type of 
dwelling or structure to be searched, the federal courts have created 
specific law regarding valid searches of multiple dwelling units like 
the type searched in Garrison. First, the police, absent a recognized 
exception, must have probable cause specifically related to each 
unit to be searched.11 Second, a search warrant for an apartment 
building or complex must describe the particular subunit to be 
searched with sufficient clarity to preclude indiscriminate searching 
of other subunits.12 
4 U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
5 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (emphasis added). The expecta-
tion of privacy must be both subjective and reasonable as recognized by society. Id. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 351. 
7 U.S. CONST, amend. IV. See also infra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
8 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). See also Marron v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
9 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925). 
10 See generally Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1018-20. 
11 United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1955). 
12 See United States v. Higgins, 428 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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III. Maryland v. Garrison 
A. Facts and Case History 
Acting upon information supplied by a reliable confidential in-
formant, a detective from the Baltimore City Police Department 
applied for a search warrant to search the residence of Lawrence 
McWebb. The informant told the detective that McWebb was 
known as "Red Cross" and that he had personally bought mari-
juana from "Red Cross" at a third floor apartment located at 2036 
Park Avenue within the previous twenty-four hours. Before apply-
ing for the warrant, the detective investigated the 2036 Park Ave-
nue premises in order to verify the information. His investigation 
included an exterior examination of the building and an inquiry to 
the Baltimore Gas & Electric Company to confirm that McWebb 
resided in the third floor apartment at 2036 Park Avenue. The in-
vestigation determined that the informant was correct in describing 
McWebb's residence.13 
The Baltimore City Police Department then obtained a warrant 
to search the person of Lawrence McWebb and "the premises 
known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment" for marijuana 
and other illegal items.14 Six officers executed the warrant on the 
same day. They fortuitously came upon McWebb in front of his 
building at 2036 Park Avenue and used his key to unlock the first 
floor door and gain entrance. McWebb immediately led the officers 
up the stairs to the third floor without permitting them to investi-
gate the layout of the first or second floors. McWebb unlocked the 
third floor door at the top of the staircase and the officers entered a 
foyer where they encountered Harold Garrison who was unknown 
to them at that time. Garrison was standing in the foyer in his bed-
clothes in front of two open doorways. To their left, the officers 
could see through a doorway into a living room area later deter-
mined to be McWebb's apartment. To their right, the officers could 
see through a doorway into a bedroom area where they could see a 
small quantity of marijuana on a dresser. They later determined the 
bedroom area to be part of Garrison's apartment.15 
Some of the officers entered Garrison's doorway to seize the ma-
rijuana and conduct a further search of the premises. Other officers 
entered and searched McWebb's apartment. While conducting the 
search of Garrison's apartment, one of the officers answered the 
telephone and the caller asked for "Red Cross", the name the in-
formant had given for McWebb. During the search, neither 
McWebb nor Garrison indicated that they lived in two separate 
apartments. Before the officers realized that there were two sepa-
13 Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1015. 
14 Id. at 1015, n. 1. 
15 Id. at 1015. 
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rate apartments, they had discovered and seized heroin, drug para-
phernalia, and approximately $4,000 in cash from Garrison's apart-
ment. As soon as the officers realized that they were in two separate 
apartments, they discontinued the search.16 
The trial court denied Garrison's motion to suppress the evidence 
seized from his apartment. The Maryland Special Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the police could 
not reasonably have discovered that the third floor contained two 
separate apartments. The court did not find that the police had 
made a reasonable mistake, but rather ruled that there was free 
access between the two apartments. Thus, in effect, only one apart-
ment existed and it was covered by the warrant. The Maryland 
Court of Appeals reversed the Special Court of Appeals, finding 
that the State was attempting to create a good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement and refused to create such an exception. 
The court found that the warrant precisely and unambiguously de-
scribed the premises to be searched and that the police improperly 
expanded the search to Garrison's apartment which was not de-
scribed in the warrant. The United States Supreme Court, in an 
opinion written by Justice Stevens, reversed the Maryland Court of 
Appeals.17 
B. United States Supreme Court 
The United States Supreme Court separated the case into two 
independent constitutional issues. First, the Court addressed 
whether the warrant itself was valid. Second, the Court addressed 
whether the execution of the warrant was reasonable.18 
In determining the validity of the warrant, the Court addressed 
the particularity requirement and considered whether a factual mis-
take invalidates a warrant.19 The Court ruled that it must judge the 
constitutionality of the officers' conduct in light of the information 
available to them at the time they applied for the warrant. The 
Court stated that "items of evidence that emerge after the warrant 
is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant was validly 
issued."20 Thus, discovery of facts after a warrant has been issued 
does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.21 Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the warrant was validly issued.22 
Regarding the execution of the search warrant, the Court recog-
nized the "need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are 
made by officers in the dangerous and difficult process of making 
arrests and executing search warrants."23 The Court heavily relied 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 1015-17. 
18 Id. at 1017. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1018. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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on its decision in Hill v. California24 in determining the reasonable-
ness of the officers' factual mistake in executing the warrant. Hill 
involved an arrest without a warrant on the mistaken belief that the 
person observed was a man whom the police had probable cause to 
arrest. The Court ruled that the officer's reasonable mistake did not 
invalidate the search incident to arrest.28 The Garrison Court ex-
tended the Hill rationale, stating that "[u]nder the reasoning in 
Hill, the validity of the search of respondent's apartment . . . de-
pends on whether the officers' failure to realize the overbreadth of 
the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable."26 The 
Court concluded that the officers in the present case satisfied this 
objective test and did not violate the fourth amendment.27 
I V . ANALYSIS 
A. The "Drug Exception" to the Fourth Amendment 
Since 1982, at least thirteen major Supreme Court decisions have 
been handed down narrowing the scope of fourth amendment pro-
tections in drug cases. The trend of the Court clearly has been to 
liberalize search rules in favor of law enforcement. 
This trend, including Garrison, unfortunately is required to rid 
our society of the prevalence of drugs and drug abuse. Drug dealers 
traditionally have gone to great lengths to confuse police searching 
for evidence so that they can establish a legal defense should a 
search be successful. Past successful tactics include using the same 
number for several apartments in the same building and using 
apartments with no numbers at all. Even if the police determine the 
correct apartment to search, the drug traffickers know that they 
have a better chance of attacking a warrant under the particularity 
requirement if these tactics are used. McWebb and Garrison may 
have employed such a tactic. They created an appearance of one 
apartment and did not inform the executing officers that two apart-
ments existed. The law should not confer special protections on 
those who fail to number their door or deceive police with confusing 
appearances. Thus, the decision in Garrison protects societal inter-
ests in undermining drug trafficking. 
B. Particularity of the Warrant 
The Supreme Court properly held that the search warrant satis-
fied the particularity requirement. Facts discovered during its exe-
24 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
25 Id. at 803-04. 
28 Garrison, 107 S. Ct. at 1019. 
27 Id. 
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cution did not retroactively invalidate it.28 The Court's ruling is 
consistent with the rationale of the particularity requirement. If a 
factual mistake is objectively reasonable, then the resulting search 
is not a general search. In the mind of a reasonable officer, the 
search is within the parameters of the warrant. In Garrison, the 
officers' extensive investigation lead them to the conclusion that 
only one apartment existed. 
C. Execution of the Warrant 
The Supreme Court properly held that the execution of the war-
rant was reasonable under the fourth amendment. One of the pur-
poses of a search warrant is to prevent hindsight from determining 
the reasonableness of a search or seizure.29 Courts must determine 
the reasonableness of warrant execution in light of the facts actu-
ally known to the police at the time of the search.30 In Garrison, 
the police reasonably did not know at the time of the search that 
two apartments existed on the third floor. Their extensive pre-
search investigation and the circumstances of the search reasonably 
lead them to the conclusion that only one apartment existed. 
The Court properly extended the holding in Hill v. California31 
to this case. In Hill, the court stated that "sufficient probability, not 
certainty, is the touchstone of the reasonableness under the fourth 
amendment . . . ."32 Similarly, in Garrison, there was a "sufficient 
probability" that the apartment the officers were searching was 
McWebb's. 
The fourth amendment protects persons against unreasonable 
searches, not imperfect ones.33 In Garrison, the Court properly rec-
ognized this distinction. Garrison takes into account the realities of 
police situations and yet requires sufficient particularity to protect 
individual liberties.34 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Garrison has identified constitutional pa-
rameters and given law enforcement officers some guidelines on per-
28 Id. at 1018. 
29 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
30 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). ' 
31 401 U.S. 797 (1971). 
32 Id. at 802. 
33 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
34 One noted commentator on the subject of search and seizure law makes a distinction 
between constitutional and unconstitutional good faith. If a mistake is one of fact that if 
true would render the search unquestionably constitutional, then the actual resulting 
search is constitutional. W. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1.2 (1978, 1986 Supp. at 8-
9). However, if a mistake leads to an improper legal conclusion such as the existence of 
probable cause, then the actual resulting search is unconstitutional. Id. Using this analy-
sis, the Garrison search would not be prohibited by the fourth amendment. 
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missible behavior. The decision allows officers to conduct their busi-
ness in executing a search warrant without constantly looking back 
to determine the factual correctness of the warrant. Clearly, law 
enforcement benefits from this. With this decision, a reasonable 
mistake in fact in applying for and executing a search warrant does 
not necessarily destroy the admissibility of its fruits. 
It appears that the Court has created a new exception to the war-
rant requirement, permitting officers to conduct warrantless 
searches when they have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief that 
they are complying with a search warrant. The Court probably in-
tended to create such an exception. The Court could have expanded 
current legal doctrine in support of its holding. Specifically, the 
Court could have invoked the good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule or expanded the plain view exception to search warrants. 
The failure to use either of these alternatives and its use of the Hill 
v. California case shows that the Court chose to create a new ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. Although this exception contin-
ues the recent trend by narrowing the scope of fourth amendment 
protection, the social gain in preventing the rapid spread of drugs in 
our country outweighs the infringement on our personal liberties. 
